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ABSTRACT
ObjectiveToexploretheintroductionofacentrallystored,
sharedelectronicpatientrecord(thesummarycarerecord
(SCR)) in England and draw wider lessons about the
implementation of large scale information technology
projects in health care.
Design Multi-site, mixed method case study applying
utilisation focused evaluation.
Setting Four early adopter sites for the SCR in England—
threeinurbanareasofrelativesocioeconomicdeprivation
and the fourth in a relatively affluent rural area.
Data sources and analysis Data included 250 staff
interviews, 1500 hours of ethnographic observation,
interviewsandfocusgroupswith170patientsandcarers,
2500 pages of correspondence and documentary
evidence, and incorporation of relevant surveys and
statistics produced by others. These were analysed by
using a thematic approach drawing on (and extending) a
theoretical model of complex change developed in a
previous systematic review.
MainfindingsThemixedfortunesoftheSCRprogrammein
its first year were largely explained by eight interacting
influences. The first was the SCR’sm a t e r i a lp r o p e r t i e s
(especiallytechnicalimmaturityandlackofinteroperability)
and attributes (especially the extent to which potential
adopters believed the benefits outweighed the risks). The
secondwasadopters’concerns (especiallyaboutworkload
andtheethicalityofsharing“confidential”informationonan
implied consent model). The third influence was
interpersonal influence (for example, opinion leaders,
champions, facilitators), and the fourth was organisational
antecedents for innovation (for example past experience
with information technology projects, leadership and
management capacity, effective data capture systems,
slack resources). Thefifthwas organisational readiness for
the SCR (for example, innovation-system fit, tension for
change, power balances between supporters and
opponents, baseline data quality). The sixth was the
implementationprocess(includingthenatureofthechange
modelandtheextenttowhichnewroutinesassociatedwith
the SCR aligned with existing organisational routines). The
seventh influence was the nature and quality of links
betweendifferentpartsofthesystem,andthefinalonewas
the wider environment (especially the political context of
the programme).
Conclusion Shared electronic records are not plug-in
technologies. They are complex innovations that must be
accepted by individual patients and staff and also
embedded in organisational and inter-organisational
routines. This process is heavily influenced at the micro-
level by the material properties of the technology,
individuals’ attitudes and concerns, and interpersonal
influence; at the meso-level by organisational
antecedents, readiness, and operational aspects of
implementation; and at the macro-level by institutional
and socio-political forces. A case study approach and
multi-level theoretical analysis can illuminate how
contextual factors shape, enable, and constrain new,
technology supported models of patient care.
INTRODUCTION
In 1998 the British prime minister, Tony Blair,
expressed his vision for universally accessible electro-
nicpatients’records:“IfIliveinBradfordandfallillin
BirminghamthenIwantthedoctortreatingmetohave
access to the information he needs.”
1 This vision is
linkedatpolicylevelwithanticipatedimprovementsin
the efficiency, safety, equity, and cost effectiveness of
care.
2-4 It has not yet been realised on a large scale
anywhere in the world, however, and many examples
exist of it turning into an expensive failure.
5-7
In general, the larger the scale of a new technology
project in health care, the greater its chances of
failure.
89 This is because healthcare information
systems are complex; they raise unique technical,
administrative, and security challenges; and introdu-
cing new technologies into a complex system requires
extensive changes in individual roles, relationships,
and business processes—the so-called “socio-techni-
cal” aspects of change. For this reason, the world waits
withinterestastheUKNationalHealthServiceunfolds
its national programme for information technology,
described as “the largest ever civilian IT project,”
10
whose scope, scale, and value for money have been
questioned by both policy makers and academics.
11-13
The national programme for information technol-
ogy is delivered centrally by Connecting for Health
(part of the Department of Health) and locally by
strategic health authorities and primary care trusts.
One component of this programme is the summary
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BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.com page 1 of 10care record (SCR), a centrally stored health summary
created from a person’s general practice record. A
person’s SCR will be accessible through a secured
extranet (N3) by a wide range of NHS staff and is
intended to support care when other records are
unavailable (for example, in emergency and unsched-
uled care). People do not have to have an SCR, but if
theydonotwantonetheymustactivelyoptout(box1).
In 2007-8, the SCR was introduced into several early
adopter sites across the United Kingdom, of which this
evaluationstudiedfour.Wesoughttobuildarichpicture
oftheintroduction,implementation,androutinisationof
the SCR at these sites at both individual (patients,
clinicians, managers) and organisational (general prac-
tice, primary care trust, unscheduled care settings,
Connecting for Health) levels, so as to draw insights
about the process of socio-technical change. The
patients’ perspective has been reported separately.
14
METHODS
Management and governance
We set up a research advisory group with a lay chair
and representatives of patients,clinicians,professional
bodies(BritishMedicalAssociationandRoyalCollege
of Nursing), and academic peers.
Design and setting
We used mixed method case study evaluation across
four SCR early adopter sites. Each site consisted of a
primary care trust, participating general practices, and
oneormorelinkedunscheduledcaresetting(suchasan
emergency department, walk-in centre, out of hours
service).ConnectingforHealthhadselectedthesesites
for inclusion in the early adopter programme in a
competitivebiddingprocess from56 applicants onthe
basis of various criteria including quality of general
practice data, track record of innovation with informa-
tion and communications technology, and local soft-
ware suppliers. The catchment populations of three
sites(inthenorthofEnglandandtheMidlands)wereof
lower than average socioeconomic status and higher
than average levels of limiting long term illness; the
fourth site was an affluent rural area in the south of
England with low levels of illness (see full report for
demographic details
15).
Theoretical framework
The data collection was driven by Patton’s utilisation
focused evaluation method.
16 We used a multi-level
theoreticalframeworkofcomplexinnovationinhealth
serviceorganisationsthatwehadpreviouslydeveloped
in a systematic literature review of some 600 sources
(including several previous systematic reviews and
meta-analyses),
17 supplemented by more recent work
on the role of information and communications
technology innovations in organisational change
efforts and the routinisation of complex
innovations.
1819 Box 2 summarises the components of
the model. We adopted the stance that because of the
complexity of the innovation, the dynamic and
contingent nature of the implementation process, and
the shifting environmental context (political, eco-
nomic, technological), complex service level innova-
tions are inherently unpredictable and that the search
for reproducible “effect sizes,”“ mediators,” and
“moderators” is likely to prove fruitless. The best we
can do is to explain what is happening as we observe it
andreflectonitinatheorydrivenway.Ourgoal(which
contrastswiththatofmanyprogrammeevaluators)was
thus interpretation rather than prediction.
16
Data sources and analysis
Data sources are summarised in box 3 and set out in
detail in our full report.
15 This study generated large
amounts of qualitative data of different forms (such as
field notes, documents, interviews, informal stories) as
well as some quantitative data (such as closed item
questionnaires, monitoring statistics). We processed
(anonymised, indexed, and coded) all data and stored
them securely. Analysis occurred in three overlapping
stages: we analysed each data source separately by
using an appropriate technique (for example, theory
driven thematic content analysis for qualitative data);
wefurtherintegratedthesefirstorderanalysesbyusing
narrative synthesis, so as to produce a coherent, multi-
level interpretation of the story at each early adopter
site; and we further synthesised insights from indivi-
dual case studies in a cross-project analysis. We
analysed data as soon as was practicable after we had
collected them so as to feed emerging findings into the
next phase of fieldwork. The synthesis phase involved
Box1 Keycharacteristicsofthesummarycarerecord
Technology
The summary care record (SCR) is a centrally stored summary of key medical details that is
created from a person’s existing NHS record (currently, the detailed record held by their
general practitioner) and made available to NHS staff in emergency and unscheduled care
situations (emergency departments, general practitioner out of hours clinics, and walk-in
centres). It is comparable to (but differs in important respects from) the emergency care
summary in Scotland and the individual health record in Wales.
What information does the SCR contain?
Information held on the SCR is currently limited to current drugs, allergies, and adverse
reactions (the “phase 1 upload”), but a minimum clinical dataset (for example, whether
someone has diabetes) (the “phase 2 upload”) is being developed and added at selected
sites.
Security safeguards
Extensive technical safeguards have been built into the SCR to prevent unauthorised
access.RolebasedaccesscontrolsrestrictaccesstoNHSstaffwithalegitimaterelationship
tothepatient.Accessbystaffwithoutsuchrelationshipsareloggedandaudited;penalties
for unauthorised access are severe and may include dismissal.
Consent model
Atthe time of the study, the consent model for the SCR was one of implied consent or “opt-
out” (that is, unless a person explicitly withdrew consent, an SCR would be created),
althoughthismodelisnowbeingrevisited.Atthetimeofwriting,patientsmaychooseoneof
three options: “don’t store” (a blank SCR will be created; nothing will be uploaded beyond
the demographic details that are already on the spine); “store and share”(a full SCR will be
created); or “store but don’ts h a r e ” (a full SCR will be created, but explicit consent must be
obtainedfromthepatienteverytimeahealthprofessionalwishestoaccessit).Anoptionfor
a “virtual sealed envelope” will also exist—a “store but don’ts h a r e ” option applied to
selective sensitive information.
RESEARCH
page 2 of 10 BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.cominterim presentations to participating primary care
trusts and incorporation of their feedback on our
interpretations.
MAIN FINDINGS
SCR early adopter programme: overview
Connecting for Health’s approach to the SCR pro-
gramme was one of active control, characterised by
detailed planning, tight monitoring, extensive docu-
mentation, and frequent reporting. This was to some
extent mirrored at primary care trust level, where
implementation had several formal stages: set-up
(establish local infrastructure; recruit staff); prepara-
tion (ensure that practices meet minimum data quality
standards, raise public awareness of the programme,
and provide patients with an opportunity to opt out if
they did not wish to have a record); “go live” (create
SCRsfromlocalgeneralpracticerecords,alsoreferred
toas“theupload”);anddeployment(supporttheuseof
the SCR inemergencyand unscheduled caresettings).
The first early adopter site began preparation in
spring 2007, and the first SCRs were created in June
2007; deployment began on a limited scale in October
2007. The second site followed soon after, but at the
third and fourth sites (which used different general
practice suppliers), go live was delayed by several
months, mainly because of the failure of software
contractors to deliver key technologies to contracted
schedules, so no data were collected from emergency
and unscheduled care settings at those sites. As of the
end of April 2008, the SCRs of 153188 patients at the
first two sites had been created. A total of 614052
patientsinfourearlyadoptersiteshadbeensentaletter
informingthemoftheprogrammeandtheirchoicesfor
optingoutofhavinganSCR(orlimitingaccesstoit).Of
these, fewer than 1% had opted out of having an SCR
and 0.03% had asked for data on their SCR not to be
shared.
Many technical glitches and operational problems
occurredwiththeSCRandthetechnicalinfrastructure
thatsupportsit.Thisisnotsurprisinginaprojectofthis
scale and complexity, but even relatively minor
problems sometimes led to long delays and consider-
able frustration in all participating organisations. This
occurred in a context in which Connecting for Health
wasconsideredtobeunderpressurefromgovernment
toredressa“worryinglackofprogress”onthenational
programme for information technology.
20 Non-parti-
cipation of general practices in the programme ranged
from7%to42%acrosstheearlyadoptersites.Thiswas
due to a variety of reasons, including doubts about the
benefits of the SCR, insufficient reimbursement,
competing priorities, inadequate data quality, incom-
patibilityoftheirsoftwaresystem,andethicalconcerns.
Key influences on how the programme unfolded are
listed below.
Material properties and attributes of the SCR
Atthetimeofthestudy(May2007toApril2008),users
perceived the SCR to be an immature technology,
described as “clunky,” and to interface poorly with
Box2 Componentsofthediffusionofinnovationmodelforcomplexinnovationsinhealth
services
17
See text for definitions and examples of organisational components
1. Material properties of the technology
To be successfully and widely adopted, a technology must include key functionality and
work smoothly and efficiently under real conditions of use
2. Attributes of the technology as an innovation
Tobesuccessfullyandwidelyadopted,atechnologymustbeseenbypotentialadoptersas
having
 Relative advantage (that is, clear benefits over existing technologies)
 Simplicity
 Compatibility with existing values and ways of working
 Trialability (can be tried out on a limited basis “without obligation”)
 Observability (benefits can be seen directly)
 Potential for reinvention (capacity for users to customise and adapt it)
3. Concerns of potential adopters
Adoption is a process, not a one-off event, and is influenced by concerns, including
 Before adoption—what are its properties and potential benefits?; what will it cost me?
 During early use—how do I make it work?; when and how should I use it?
 During established use—how can I alter or improve it?
4. Communication and influence
Ap e r s o n ’s decision to adopt an innovation is influenced by
 Mass media (press, mail shots), which can raise awareness
 Interpersonalinfluence(bychampions,opinionleaders,forexample),whichcanchange
people’s attitudes towards adoption
5. Organisational antecedents for innovation
Organisationsmaybemoreorlessinnovative.Differencesareexplainedbyseveralfactors:
 Absorptive capacity for new knowledge
 Leadership and management
 Risk taking climate
 Effective data capture systems
 Slack resources
6. Organisational readiness for innovation
An organisation must be “ready” for a specific innovation. Readiness includes
 Innovation-system fit
 Tension for change
 Balance between supporters and opponents
 Specific preparedness
7. The implementation and routinisation process
Implementing a complex innovation, and making sure it becomes business as usual, is a
highly non-linear process, typically characterised by shocks and setbacks. Critical success
factors include
 Appropriate change model (balance between “make it happen” and “let it emerge”)
 Good project management
 Autonomy of frontline teams
 Human resource factors, especially the selection, retention, continuity, and training of
staff
 Alignment between new and old routines
8. Linkage
Innovation is more likely when there is
 Early and ongoing dialogue between the developers of the innovation, the change
agents charged with promoting its adoption, and the end users
 Communication within the organisation and between similar organisations
9. The wider environment
Innovationinorganisationsismorelikelywhena“followingpolicywind,”aconducivesocio-
political climate, and specific incentives and mandates at national level are present
RESEARCH
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had given up using it “until it works better.” Wide
variability existed among NHS staff on whether they
felt the SCR had significant benefits, although most
were broadly enthusiastic. A widespread perception
existed thatthe consent model,the opt-outmodel,and
role based access controls (box 1) were “too compli-
cated to work in practice.” We noted an inherent
imbalance between people who must work to upload
patients’ SCRs (general practitioners and their staff)
and those who will see its benefits most directly (staff
working in emergency settings).
A small minority of general practitioners saw the
SCR as fundamentally eroding the essence of their
workandtheirprofessionalidentity.Theyfeltstrongly
that their role was to “protect” their patients’ data
rather than to “pass it to the government.” However,
other general practitioners argued that contemporary
health care requires a radical change in how con-
fidentialityandprivacyaredefined(fromapropertyof
theindividualdoctor-patientrelationship,mediatedby
the human qualities of the doctor, to a property of the
system as a whole, mediated by technical and opera-
tional security measures).
Concerns about the SCR and its use
Themainconcernsofgeneralpracticesinearlyadopter
sites were workload and the ethics of consent. Work-
loadforphase1waslowerthananticipatedandmainly
comprised the administrative task of meeting quality
standards for data. General practitioners were con-
cernedthatan“opt-in”consentmodelfortheimminent
phase 2 upload (box 1) would generate a large
workload for practices, especially for clinicians who
may have to add information to records one by one.
Other concerns included whether the implied consent
model was legal, whether patients understood the
choices they were being asked to make, whether the
record was technically and operationally secure,
whether participation in the programme would erode
patients’trustinthepractice,andtheriskofthesystem
grindingtoahaltduringtheupload.Concernsofstaffin
unscheduled care settings mainly related to the
technical usability of the software.
Influencing people’s decision to adopt the SCR
In common with previous research on the adoption of
innovations by individual people,
21 this study showed
thatmassmediacampaigns(mailshots,presscoverage,
road shows) were relatively ineffective in influencing
people’sattitudestotheSCR.
14ConnectingforHealth
recognised the need for interpersonal influence from
the outset and appointed two “opinion leaders”
(national clinical leads), who travelled the country to
explain what the SCR was, hear the concerns of their
fellow general practitioners, and try to make their
audiences more receptive to the programme. These
events were popular, and the national clinical leads
were seen as credible, although many people thought
that clinical engagement suffered through externally
imposed timescales and milestones.
All participating primary care trusts had at least one
local champion—an enthusiastic general practitioner or
seniornursewhomadeastronglinkbetweendeveloping
information technology infrastructure and improving
care of patients,
22 and who typically became a “super
user” (a person showing early and sophisticated use of
the SCR in a way that others could learn from
23). These
local championstypically heldotherrolesinquality and
Box3 Summaryofdatasources
Fulldetailsofthesedatasources,includinginterviewschedules,aregiveninthefullreport
15
Qualitative (non-numerical) data
 250 in-depth interviews with staff involved with the summary care record project or
comparable projects, comprising
51 with Connecting for Health (CFH) staff
44 with primary care trust (PCT) staff
82 with staff in general practices (including some in non-participating practices)
41 with staff in unscheduled care settings
32withstaffand“expertpatients”involuntarysector,patients’organisations,andother
non-NHS stakeholder organisations (not including patient/carer interviews below)
 Approximately 1500 hours of ethnographic observation, comprising
400 hours at CFH (observing committees, working groups, team meetings, phone-ins,
presentations, and informal contacts with CFH staff)
350 hours at PCTs (observing project board meetings, team meetings, engagement
events, training events, and so on)
400 hours in general practices (observing reception areas, waiting rooms, and
consultations)
150 hours in emergency and unscheduled care settings (observing reception areas,
waiting rooms, consultations, and call centres)
40 hours in settings where a comparable innovation had been introduced (such as
Scotland)
180 hours observing the voluntary sector, patients’ groups, campaigns, and so on
 Approximately 2500 pages of documentary data, comprising
1200 pages from CFH (committee and board papers, internal emails, internal and
consultancy reports, contracts, press releases, and similar documents)
1300 pages from the early adopter PCTs and general practices (for example, project
initiationdocument,boardpapers,minutesofmeetings,progressreportstoCFH,email
exchanges)
 Asmall“mysteryshopper”surveycomprising12questionsaskedtoadvisersontheNHS
InformationLine,targetingissuesthathademergedasconfusingorcontroversialinour
other data sources
 An analysis of the foreign language leaflets produced by CFH, in which each leaflet was
shown to two bilingual people (one with a research/medical background and one
selected to provide a “lay” perspective)
 Brief interviews with 103 patients or carers plus seven focus groups involving a total of
67 people who had potentially stigmatising conditions or difficulties accessing health
care (reported in detail separately
14)
Quantitative (numerical) data
 Publicly available data on population demographics, socioeconomic deprivation,
burden of disease, and satisfaction with general practitioners’ services
 Closed itemquestionnaireitemsdevelopedbyourownteamforinterviewswithstaffin
participating PCTs
 Regular uptake statisticsproduced byCFH and participating PCTs—for example, on the
proportion of records uploaded by a given date
 TheTNSUKtrackersurveysofpublicattitudestothenationalprogrammeforinformation
technology and SCR, summarised in detail in our full evaluation report
15
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member of the professional executive committee of the
primary care trust) and framed the SCR programme as
part of their wider quality role across the organisation.
Sometimes “negative champions” opposed the pro-
gramme. If these people occupied key positions (for
example, on the local medical committee), they had
significant influence on the pace of progress.
In general, general practitioners who also worked in
the out of hours service were keen to see the SCR
implemented. This is a classic “boundary spanning”
phenomenon (in which people who worked in more
than one organisation cross fertilised ideas between
them). In common with the findings of previous
studies,
17 boundary spanners seemed to be powerful
agents of change.
Organisational antecedents for innovation
Several characteristics of participating organisations
seemed to be important in explaining the fortunes of
the SCR.
Absorptive capacity for new knowledge
Absorptive capacity is defined as a combination of
formal expertise, informal organisational know-how,
technical infrastructure, and relevant interpersonal
networks.
24 Practice 16, for example, was one of the
firsttosuccessfullyuploadrecords,anditdidsorapidly
and efficiently. It had a top of the range information
system,andtheseniorpartnerwastechnicallykeenand
capable,withstronglinkstohissystemsupplierandthe
national programme for information technology.
Informatics training for staff was prioritised, in-house
expertise in information technology was high, and
technicalknow-howcirculatedinformallyamongstaff.
In contrast, practice 37 experienced many delays and
problems and was very dependent on external
technical support. Despite the fact that the practice
was large with an engaged management team, well
appointed premises, and dedicated summarising staff,
little in-house expertise in information technology
existed. Indeed, this was not seen as a key skill needed
by all staff but was delegated to the one “technical”
general practitioner. Lack of relevant skills within the
practice meant that little was learnt from encounters
withtechnicalsupportstaff,andenthusiasmtodevelop
internal networks to share technical learning was
limited.
Leadership and management capacity
The importance of strong leadership, good strategic
vision, good managerial relations, and committed and
competent staff in introducing complex innovation is
well established.
25 In practice 1, some staff had initial
reservations about the SCR project. One partner
championed the project and persuaded others that it
was well aligned with the overall goals of the practice
andwouldbenefitpatients.Thepractice’sleadgeneral
practitioner for information technology subsequently
took over responsibility for the project and also
become a national clinical lead. In contrast, practice 6
signed up to the SCR project but was characterised
from the outset by lack of leadership from the senior
partner and to some extent also the practice manager;
this practice needed considerable input from the
primary care trust to achieve “go live.”
Risk taking climate
Arisktakingclimateisoneinwhichexperimentationis
encouraged; failed projects lead to reflection and
efforts to improve features of the system.
25 For
example, a general practitioner from practice 28
reflected, “We’ve gone through the years making
mistakes,yousee.Andyoulearnfromthem.Andthat’s
oneofthethingswecanturnaroundandsay,‘Wemade
the mistakes, we’ve learned from them and we have
moved on’.” This general practitioner described
several of what he called past “failures” in implement-
ing information technology innovations, but the over-
all story was an impressive track record of success (for
example, with Choose and Book, GP2GP, and
ePrescribing).
Efficient data capture
Ourfindingsconfirmedthatinnovationismorereadily
introduced when systems are in place to capture data
on performance and feed it into organisational
learning.
25 For example, practice 31, which easily
achievedthedataqualitystandards,showedasystema-
tic and reflexive approach to data collection and
analysis. The manager commented, “We find that for
whateverreasonsomethingwillcomeup[onanaudit],
and we ask, now is that a one-off or is it someone or
something needing to change? It’s a training mechan-
ism as well as an audit.” This approach contrasted
markedly with that of practice 33, where errors
detected through audit were given to the general
practitionersto“fix”(withaviewtomeetingstandards),
but no reflection on, or efforts to correct, underlying
systemlevelerrorsoccurred.Thepracticemanagerfelt
that “data quality is no better than it was before. . .
[audit] has just created a lot of extra work.”
Slack resources
“Organisational slack” is a term used to denote spare
time, money, or expertise that can be channelled into
new projects.
26 In this study, small practices in
particular found that lack of any staff who could free
up time to spend time on the project was an important
barrier to successful implementation. Practice 33’s
manager, for example, commented, “They initially
sentsomeoneouttoexplainwhatneededdoing,leftme
a list to work on. . . [it] would have been nice to have
money and staff to work on it. I think that bigger
practices would find it easier to do; in larger practice
with more staff some of the work could be delegated
out, but in this practice there’s no one else to do it.”
Organisational readiness for SCR
In addition to general antecedents, several factors
specific to the SCR helped to explain the success of
efforts to introduce it locally.
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Innovation-system fit refers to the degree of alignment
between the organisation’s wider development goals
and the introduction of a specific innovation.
17 For
example,themanagerofoutofhoursclinicElinkedthe
SCR to a wider strategy for an integrated service to
replacethepreviousfragmentedone.Shetalkedabout
unacceptable experiences for patients (long waits,
questionable clinical care, poor premises, loss of
dignity) and financial waste (for example, through
unnecessary acute admissions) and described a vision
of a “state-of the art” out of hours service with a new
building (currently under construction), well trained
professionalstaff,efficientinfrastructure,andseamless
communication between organisations.
Tension for change
Tensionforchangereferstotheextenttowhichpeople
are uncomfortable with the status quo and feel that
something has to change.
27 In out of hours clinic E, for
example, clinicians felt that assessing patients without
accesstorecordswas“stabbinginthedark”andplaced
patient safety at risk. Considerable enthusiasm existed
fortheSCRasapotentialsolutiontothisunacceptable
situation.Incontrast,severalpracticesthathadinitially
signed up to the SCR project but had subsequently
withdrawn from it reflected that little tension for
change had existed within their organisation: “We
were very, very strongly encouraged to go ahead [by
the primary care trust]. [We] wouldn’t have done it
otherwise” (manager from practice 14).
Balance of support
Wheresupportersofacomplexinnovationoutnumber
its opponents and are more strategically placed,
innovation is generally more successful
27; our data
affirmed this. In practice 2, for example, one of the
three partners and the practice manager strongly
supported the SCR project and the senior partner was
also broadly supportive. The third partner was some-
what opposed, but his position was not strong enough
to stop the practice from participating. In practice 28,
the general practitioner information technology lead
was very enthusiastic about the SCR and many other
staff were also keen. The primary care trust and
Connecting for Health initially saw it as a “flagship”
practice for the SCR programme. However, the
CaldicottGuardianwasstronglyopposedtotheimplied
consent model and provided well argued resistance to
it. To the surprise and disappointment of the trust,
practice 28 withdrew from the programme.
Specific preparedness
Innovation in organisations is more successful when
preliminary groundwork has been done to the
necessary standard.
17 Many practices attributed the
relativelysmoothuploadofrecordstotheSCRtogood
overall quality of data, usually linked to the informa-
tion management and technology directly enhanced
service initiative (a financial incentive scheme to
improve the quality of data). In contrast, one practice
that struggled with preparations for the upload phase
subsequently reflected, “We were surprised we were
chosen [as an early adopter of the SCR], because we
haveonlycomputerised60%ofourrecordssofar,and
when we started we were on nothing” (manager,
practice 6).
The implementation and routinisation process
Making the SCR “business as usual” in any organisa-
tion involved a lot of work. Several influences were
evident.
Appropriateness of change model
All complex innovation requires a judicious balance
between managerial (“make it happen”) and develop-
mental (“let it emerge”) approaches.
17 Widespread
resentment existed among participating primary care
trusts that Connecting for Health pushed forward on a
tightly managed, largely non-negotiable timetable
despite the immaturity of technical solutions. General
practicesandunscheduledcareprovidersresentedthat
they were in turn pushed excessively by primary care
trusts.Someclinicians’leadersbelievedthattheywere
not adequately consulted because of spurious dead-
lines. Many interviewees complained that, in the
circumstances, the unseemly haste was somewhat
absurdandfeltthatdepthofcommitmenthadsuffered.
Effective project management
Clear goals, realistic milestones, efficient delivery and
coordination, and attention to follow-through are well
established elements of the success of any complex
project.Ingeneral,operationalmanagementwasgood
inmostearlyadopterorganisations.Whenthiswasnot
the case (for example, when posts were unfilled,
managers lacked key skills, or workload outstripped
availablefundingforstaff),organisationsstruggledand
delays occurred: “We haven’tb e e ng i v e na n y
resources to deal with the extra workload for returned
mail [or] clinicians having to add to the records for
phase 2” (manager, practice 21, which withdrew from
the early adopter programme).
Autonomy of front line teams
Complex innovation is generally more successful if
responsibility for operational decision making is
devolved to front line teams.
17 To some extent, our
data affirmed this. Several practices, for example,
described a process of adapting the instructions
provided by Connecting for Health or the primary
care trust so as to make them workable locally: “The
process maps were just triangles, squares, and circles
and didn’t mean anything, and something shorter and
moreconcisewasneededforin-houseuse.It’smygirls
from [the practice] having to do this” (manager,
practice 1). However, we also found that many
practices were happy for the primary care trust to
take over the change process and seemed to welcome
the lack of autonomy: “[We have] hardly any personal
responsibility” (manager, practice 22); “[We are] wait-
ing for instructions” (manager, practice 17).
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Successful implementation generally depends on
recruitment and retention of staff with key skills,
knowledge, and credibility.
17 One of the most success-
ful practices (practice 2) had a longstanding and close
knit team of staff—the two senior administrators had
beenthereformorethan20years—andagoodbalance
of skills including information technology and project
management.Staffattributedtheirsuccesstotheinput,
enthusiasm, and goodwill of all team members. At
primary care trust level, limited success with imple-
mentation of the SCR was often attributed to failure to
appoint staff with key experience and qualities
(especially in relation to data quality work).
Another aspect of human resources is training—
especially hands-on, on the job training for individual
staff members; informal and “helpdesk” support for
new users; and team training for tasks requiring
teamwork.
17 In practice 17, training was viewed
particularly positively because the trainer had been
“professional” and “flexible”—that is, he had run
several sessions in order to cover all staff and had
personalised the sessions to individual needs. Staff at
thispracticewereconfidentandkeentostartworkwith
the new technology. More commonly, however,
practices felt that training had been badly timed or
difficulttoapplyinpractice.Themanagerofpractice8
commented that “the PCT people arrived with their
packs and slide shows, and it’s just nothing like that”
and that after this initial training session “we were
dreading it [the SCR upload].”
Alignment of routines
A key determinant of successful innovation is whether
the new routine associated with the innovation aligns
rather than conflicts with existing organisational and
inter-organisational routines.
19 In one participating
emergency department (D), a well established “target
chaser” role existed, which already involved logging
on to a computer and bringing blood test results or
other clinical information from the record to the
attending clinician. In this setting, the SCR was
described as “no more of a problem than any other
aspect of medical records” (manager, site D). In
another emergency department (A), the SCR could
not be accessed as part of the receptionist’s role,
because of the promise made in the Connecting for
Health confidentiality leaflet that receptionists would
notsee patients’clinical details.Thetask wasallocated
to healthcare assistants, but it was poorly aligned with
their existing role, so accessing patients’ SCRs proved
difficult operationally.
Links between different parts of the system
One system level aspect of innovation previously
shown to have a significant impact on innovation
success is “linkage”—that is, ongoing formal and
informal exchange of knowledge between different
parts of the system, which tends to lead to a shared
vision and common language for describing the
innovation and to mutual understanding.
17 In this
study, we identified two important problems with
linkage.
Linkage between technical developers and SCR users
LinksbetweenthetechnicaldevelopersoftheSCRand
itsendusers(suchasgeneralpractitioners)tendedtobe
characterised by lack of shared vision or language and
low levels of mutual understanding. For example, one
general practitioner who visited Connecting for
Health’s technical base to talk to technical staff
expressed surprise that “we were having to explain to
them how it [the user interface of the SCR] worked
rather than the other way round, yet until that point I
thought they were the experts” (general practitioner,
practice 2). Many end users attributed the SCR’s
persistent “clunkiness” to poor linkage with the
product’s designers.
Intra-organisational and inter-organisational knowledge
sharing
The early adopter programme was characterised by
relatively weak lateral links between participating
organisations in relation to their work on the SCR.
One primary care trust manager, for example, felt that
“we couldn’t learn from X [neighbouring trust,also an
early adopter site]; they’re very different from us and
we had to work it out ourselves in a way that was
relevanttous.”ConnectingforHealth heldoneortwo
networkingeventstobringpeoplefrom differentearly
adopter primary care trusts together. These events
seem to be valued by participants: “Very useful—I’ve
met people facing the same problems as I’m facing”
(comment on evaluation form). We found few exam-
ples of specific exchange of knowledge, however. This
maypartlyexplainwhysomeparticipantsfeltasenseof
“reinventing the wheel” rather than building on the
experience of others.
Wider socio-political environment
TheofficialpolicywindfromtheDepartmentofHealth
was certainly blowing in the direction of the SCR, but
other forces were operating in the opposite direction.
In particular, many stories in the media in 2007-8
reported large scale losses of data by government and
theNHS;astrongcivillibertiesmovementwasarguing
for less state control of private data, including opt-out
campaigns led or endorsed by doctors; and some
sectors of the medical press presented a series of small
incidents which (allegedly) “proved” that the whole
SCR initiative was a “fiasco.” All this contributed to a
climate of uncertainty, which some practices cited as a
reason for not wishing to be involved in the pro-
gramme.
DISCUSSION
This case study, as well as our linked paper on the
perspective of patients,
14 has illustrated that shared
electronic patients’ records are not plug-in technolo-
gies. They are complex innovations that must be
accepted by individual patients and staff and
embeddedinorganisationalandsystemlevelroutines.
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the material properties of the technology, people’s
attitudes and concerns, and interpersonal influence; at
the meso-level by organisational antecedents, readi-
ness,andoperationalaspectsofimplementation;andat
the macro-level by institutional and socio-political
forces. The use of a case study approach based on
extensive ethnography allowed us to document how
interactions at these multiple levels shape, enable, and
constrain the introduction of technology supported
innovations in clinical care.
28
Self selecting innovators
All early adopter primary care trusts studied in this
evaluation, and many participating general practices,
scored highly on organisational antecedents for
introducing new technologies, organisational readi-
ness forthe SCR, and operationalaspects ofmanaging
theSCRproject.Theseorganisationshadbeenselected
for key characteristics (such as a track record of
successful innovation in information technology) that
accountedatleastinpartfortheirsuccessandwerealso
self selecting for “readiness” for the SCR. As the SCR
programme expands, organisational weaknesses that
werenotseenintheearlyadoptersarelikelytobecome
apparent. One way of tackling this is to try to build
absorptive capacity through approaches such as the
information technology training and facilitation for
practices offered by the PRIMIS+ support team (see
www.primis.nhs.uk/). Another is to continue to work
proactively with both national and local opinion
leaders and champions to ensure that the impact of
interpersonal influence on clinical engagement (and
hence on readiness of primary care trusts and general
practices) is maximised.
Consent model
OneoftheleastpopularaspectsoftheSCRprogramme
was the “hybrid” consent model (box 1), which some
participants viewed as unethical (because records are
initially uploaded without explicit consent) and others
as unworkable (because, in phase 2, clinicians will be
required to obtain explicit consent from millions of
patients).Thesepositionsrepresentthepolesofatrade-
off between high coverage of the population and
gaining explicit consent for every record uploaded.
Shared electronic record programmes in Scotland
(emergency care summary), Wales (individual health
record),andFrance(dossiermédicalpersonnel)haveto
someextentsquaredthiscirclebycombining“implied
consent to upload” with “explicit consent to view” at
the point of care, although this has not been without
controversy.
29-32 Connecting for Health is reviewing
the SCR consent model in the light of our findings.
Workload
Our suspicion that the SCR programme would be
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and
unpredictability,andthattheburdenandimpactofthe
programme would be impossible to quantify with any
precision,wasconfirmed.Severalstakeholderswanted
this evaluation to “measure the workload” associated
with the creation and deployment of the SCR.
Although some people saw this as a simple exercise
in accounting for time spent on SCR related tasks, the
evaluation revealed a more fluid, unpredictable, and
complex picture; the burden and impact of the SCR
programme was impossible to quantify with any
precision. For example, work on implementation of
the SCR overlapped with other work (most obviously,
the duty of all doctors to maintain accurate and up to
date records) and increased substantially with the
assiduousness of efforts to encourage patients to
consider their choices.
Technology push or socio-technical change?
The predominant change model adopted for the SCR
programme was one of “technology push”—centrally
driven, rationalistic, with a focus on documentation
and reporting, and oriented to predefined, relatively
inflexible goals. Connecting for Health has been
criticised in the past for such an approach and is
actively seeking to change it.
8 When we began this
evaluation in April 2007, for example, it was already
somethingofaclichéwithinConnectingforHealththat
the national programme for information should be
viewed as “10% technology, 90% business change,”
although many staff equated the latter with the
provision of business tools. Nevertheless, coexisting
with Connecting for Health’s technology push model
(and more prevalent in some sections of the pro-
grammethanothers)wereoccasionalinitiativessuchas
away-days, networking events, and consultations that
resonated with more contemporary models of change
built around theories of co-evolution and knowledge
creation, and which reflect a “socio-technical pull”
model.
15Ourdata,alongwithresearchoncomparable
initiatives within and outside the UK,
5-733 suggest that
astheSCRprogrammeexpands,furthermovementin
this socio-technical direction is likely to improve its
chances of success.
Asocio-technicalchangemodelwouldtransformthe
SCRprogrammesubstantially—forexample,theSCR
wouldnolongerbeseenasanendinitself(withsuccess
measuredin termsofnumberofrecordsuploadedand
extentofuse)butasameanstootherends(withsuccess
being defined in terms of a range of locally relevant
ends, for which the SCR would be provided as a
resource). Whereas Connecting for Health staff talked
about “implementing the SCR,” primary care trusts
generally spoke about integrating the SCR as a part of
the infrastructurefora widerstrategicchange.Empha-
sis would need to shift from project management (that
is,runningacircumscribedinitiativewithapredefined,
measurable goal by working systematically and fixing
problems along the way) to programme management
(thatis,bringingtogethermultipleelementsiniterative
and adaptive ways against an ever changing back-
ground context, towards a more abstract goal such as
“improving access to health records in emergency
settings”). This goal needs to be continually redefined
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is better able to transcend systemshocks (such asshifts
in technology specification or prevailing information
technologypolicy).
34Theskillsofprojectmanagement
relate to planning, organising, monitoring, adjusting,
documenting, and reporting. Those of programme
managementincludenegotiation,sensemaking,synth-
esis, and (above all) situational judgment. Both
Connecting for Health and primary care trusts might
considerselectinganddevelopingstaffforthislastskill
set.
Time to reappraise Connecting for Health’sg o a l s ?
However, political expectations could stymie this
radical shift in the change model. A widespread
assumption is that the SCR programme should be
evaluatedprimarilyintermsof theextentto whichit is
on (or behind) schedule, rather than by softer, more
emergent metrics such as the extent of clinical and
public engagementor innovation-systemfit. Although
levellingcriticismatConnectingforHealthforusingan
out of date change model is easy, the programme is
constrained by the fact that the various instruments of
governance for the national programme for informa-
tion technology (see, for example, reports from the
National Audit Office
11 and Public Accounts
Committee
12) have largely failed to recognise the
incompatibility of a socio-technical approach to
change with fixed, time limited goals and milestones.
“Realising the benefits”—ao n es i d e dv i s i o n ?
Much debate about the SCR programme is currently
couched in the discourse of “benefits realisation” (for
example, Connecting for Health and strategic health
authorities are expected to develop and apply formal
metrics to measure the number of lives saved, adverse
reactions averted, duplicate tests avoided, or patients
empowered per pound invested in the programme).
This approach assumes not only that developing and
applyingmeaningfulmetricsinthisareaispossiblebut
alsothatsuchmetricscanbeestablishedinadvanceand
usedtoperformancemanagethepublicbodiescharged
with implementing the programme. Both assumptions
arehighlyquestionable.Berg,forexample,hasargued
persuasively that any measures of the success of large
scale information technology programmes in health
care must be developed organically alongside the
operational characteristics of the technology in use,
through a process of technological (re)design, con-
sultation, negotiation, and policy deliberation—and
the fitness for purpose of such metrics must be
continually questioned as the programme develops.
35
Inourview,fortheSCRtohaveanychanceofbucking
the current trend of failed large scale information
technology projects in health care, politicians, press,
and public must begin to conduct their deliberations
within this wider socio-technical discourse.
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